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Abstract: 
 
A multinational corporation’s (MNC) entry into a host country brings benefits to the 
economy of that country, some direct (such as increasing production and employment) and 
some indirect (such as productivity spin-off). Governments that view MNCs as engines for 
growth and regional development have begun to encourage the flow of foreign investment 
into their country in hopes of increased local employment, market production and export 
capacity. MNCs consider first the maximization of profit when selecting a site to establish 
their subsidiaries. An MNC examines possible investment sites and indicates those that are 
best fitted for the investment. The countries that remain at this stage are similar in terms of 
their economic characteristics, and they compete with each other for receiving the foreign 
investment.  
In this paper we use tools from auction theory to analyze the competition between 
host countries and MNCs and investigate the existence of Nash equilibrium strategies. The 
characteristics of this equilibrium are considered and assessed. 
We developed a general model for examining the incentive competition between two 
countries and then apply it for several subgroups according to the number of MNCs and the 
availability of information. It turns out that the characteristics of the equilibrium depend on 
the number of MNCs as well as on the structure of their contribution to the host country 
economy.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A multinational corporation’s (MNC) entry into a host country is 
accompanied by many benefits for that country’s economy, some direct (such as 
increasing production and employment) and some indirect (such as productivity 
spin-off). Many governments that view MNCs as an engine for growth and regional 
development, with the possibility of expanding local employment as well as the 
market’s production and export capacity, have begun to encourage the flow of 
foreign investment into their country. The considerations of an MNC for choosing a 
site to establish a subsidiary are mostly concerned with the maximization of profit. 
In the first stage, the MNC examines possible investment sites and designates those 
that are suitable for the investment. In the second stage, the MNC chooses the site 
that maximizes its profits, where the level of profit is affected by the incentives 
offered by the host country. The countries remaining at this stage are similar in 
terms of their economic characteristics, and they compete with each other for the 
foreign investment by offering attractive incentives. 
 In this paper, we use tools from auction theory to analyze the competition 
among the home country (HC) and the MNCs and investigate the existence of Nash 
equilibrium strategies. The characteristics of this equilibrium are presented and 
assessed. 
 We developed a general model for examining the incentive competition 
between two HCs. Then, we extend the basic model and apply it to several 
subgroups according to the number of MNCs and the availability of information. It 
turns out that the characteristics of the equilibrium depend on the number of MNCs, 
as well as on the structure of their contribution to the host country economy.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows: The following section 
provides a brief review of the relevant literature. The third section presents 
the considerations of an MNC when determining an optimal location for its 
subsidiary and the considerations of a government that uses FDI incentives. 
Section four discusses several models of incentives competition. In section 
five models of incomplete information are discussed.  A brief summary of the 
main results is presented in the last section. 
 
2. Background  
 
The establishment of a subsidiary by an MNC may increase the HC’s GDP 
in various ways: increasing employment, transfer of new technology, access to 
world markets, access to the MNC’s R&D, and so on. The benefit to the HC is 
higher when there are productivity and technological spillovers. Chuang and Lin 
(1999), Driffield (2001), and Lipsey and Sjoholm (2001) found that technology 
spillovers exist in the UK, Taiwan and Indonesia and contribute to the economic 
growth of these economies (see also Dimelis and Louri, 2002). However, Konings 
(2000) showed that in several countries (e.g., Bulgaria and Rumania), the FDI may 
have a negative impact on the economy. 
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 The current location theory (see, for example, Dunning, 1993; Globerman 
and Shapiro, 1999; Shapiro and Globerman, 2001) asserts that the MNC optimal 
location is determined in a two-stage process. In the first stage, a short list is 
prepared of potential locations that are characterized by a stable economy, big 
markets, high and growing income per capita, modern infrastructure and good 
trading conditions with other countries. In the second stage, the MNC assesses the 
financial conditions in each of these locations, including the following variables: 
corporate tax rates, factors prices, labor costs and so on. In this stage, countries that 
are on the short list compete for the FDI by offering grants, tax reductions, and 
subsidies for various factors of production. For example, INTEL received a 300 
million dollar grant from the government of Costa Rica, which was instrumental in 
persuading the company to choose that country for its new plant. Canon Company 
chose Vietnam for its new subsidiary after the Vietnamese government offered a 
reduction in tax rates for 10 years (see Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006). 
 A situation where countries with similar characteristics compete for FDI by 
offering incentives is called incentives competition. This competition affects the 
allocation of benefits between the host country and the MNC. Oman (2000) asserted 
that the MNC’s share is close to one. Blomstrom and Kokko (2003) even proposed 
that “rules of game” be imposed to prevent this outcome and to leave a larger share 
of the benefits in the host country. Other studies emphasized the advantage of 
competition among countries. For example, Barros and Cabral (2000) showed that 
when countries differ in their size and unemployment rates, subsidy competition 
leads to optimal FDI location. Similar results can be found in Bjorvatn and Eckel 
(2006), who show that incentives competition may cause the MNC to locate its 
subsidiary in the country that has the highest benefits of FDI. 
 In our paper, we investigate the incentives competition by applying 
models of auction theory, and then we present characteristics of the 
equilibrium strategies. 
 
3. Considerations of the MNC and the HC 
 
The problem of an MNC is to decide where to locate its subsidiary. Let τπ ij  
denote the expected profits of an MNC j in a country i at time τ. Let it  denote the 
corporate tax rate in country i. The net present value of the expected stream of profit 
if ijI  is invested in the subsidiary, which is located in country i is: 
 
(1) 
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where k is the MNC discount rate. 
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 Under the assumption that only one subsidiary can be established, the MNC 
should choose the optimal location, that is, the country that maximizes the present 
value of the profit per unit of investment: 
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where ijG  is the grant offered by country i to MNC j. ijG  is a decision variable of 
country i. 
 When the HC competes for an MNC, it considers the benefits that can be 
derived from the MNC’s activities in the country. We can classify these benefits into 
two kinds: direct benefits (DB), such as wages paid to workers who where 
previously unemployed and corporate taxes paid by the MNC to the HC’s 
government, and indirect benefits (IDB), such as spillovers of new technologies, and 
so on. The total benefits country i derives from the j MNC, TBij, at time τ is: 
 
(3 )  TB i j=D B i j+ID B i j  
 
 Let ri represent the discount rate of country i. Then, the present value of the 
benefits due to establishing a subsidiary by MNC j, Rij is: 
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The grant, Gij, is paid by the HC to the MNC, and therefore the net present value of 
the benefits of HC is: 
 
(5 )  N B i j =R i j -G i j  
 
The HC’s goal is to maximize this value, subject to the condition that 0NBij > . 
 As we noted before, the profitability for the HC and for the MNC depends 
on future outcomes. The quality of the estimated level of profits depends on the 
availability of information on the future expected values of the cash flows stemming 
from the project. 
 Complete information enables us to predict the accurate future cash 
flow of the project. In this case, both the MNC and the HC are indifferent to 
the type of incentives (a grant or tax relief) when both types prove to have the 
same net present value. Under incomplete information, the importance of an 
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incentive scheme increases. Usually, the host country prefers tax relief that 
minimizes its risk, but the MNC prefers grants so that possible changes in 
future tax schemes can be avoided. Both cases are considered in our paper.  
 
4. Models of Incentives Competition under Complete Information 
 
We assume that the HC and the MNC have complete information and can 
make an accurate prediction of the future value of cash flows from the MNC’s 
investment in the HC. In addition, we assume that the tax rate is constant for the 
project’s lifetime and that the only way to provide FDI incentives is by offering the 
MNC a grant. We consider the incentives competition to be an auction where each 
HC offers a grant and the MNC chooses the country that provides it with the highest 
net present value of profits. The grant is paid only if the subsidiary is actually 
established. Therefore, we can apply models of first-price auction. 
 We deal with the following types of situations: 
• Two countries compete for a single MNC. 
• Two countries compete for two MNCs. 
• There are homogenous and nonhomogenous countries. 
4.1 Two Homogenous Countries Compete for One MNC 
Two HCi (i=1,2) compete for an investment of one MNC, where Ri represents the 
value of total net benefits of host country i (R1=R2). When a HC offers a grant (Gi), 
its net benefits are: NBi=Ri-Gi. Each country can offer a specific amount of the 
grant from a list of possible grants Gij (j=1,…,M), such that Gi1<Gi2....<GiM. When 
the two countries are economically homogenous, it means that that the MNC’s after-
tax cash flows ti·i are the same in both countries. The MNC that wishes to 
maximize its PI (the present value of the profits per unit of investment) will choose 
the host country that pays the higher grant.1 
 We look for the dominant strategy of HCi in terms of the grant (Gi) to be 
offered. 
Proposition 1. 
For each HC strategy x:{Gi=Ri} dominates strategy y:{Gi>Ri}. 
Proof: 
Let us assume that HC2 uses strategy y:{G2>R2}. What would be the best strategy x 
for country one? 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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1 Since we assume complete information, the competition between HCs can be 
described as either grant competition or tax relief competition. 
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 When HC1’s grant is smaller then that of HC2, the MNC chooses to invest in 
HC2. In this case, NB1=0. For all other cases, NB1<0: if HC1 will pay 
G1=G2>R2=R1, then HC1 will win with the probability of ½, and NB1 will be 
negative. If G1>G2>R2=R1, then HC1 will win, but NB1 will be negative. 
Proposition 2. 
When R1=R2, strategy x:{Gi=Ri} dominates strategy y:{Gi<Ri}. 
Proof: 
For simplicity we assume that G1m=G2m for each m. Table 1 presents the NB for each 
country for all possible grants: 
 
Table 1. Net benefits of each country that faces a single MNC 
(assuming homogenous countries) 
G2M ....... G22 G21  
2 2M0 ; R G−  ....... 2 220 ;R G−  ( )i i1
1 R G
2
−  
G11 
2 2M0 ; R G−  ....... ( )i i2
1 R G
2
−  1 12R G ; 0−  G12 
M  O  M  M  M  
( )i iM
1 R G
2
−  
....... 
1 1MR G ; 0−
 
1 1MR G ; 0−
 
G1M 
 
 The equilibrium strategies are: G1=R1 and G2=R2. As R1=R2, the MNC is 
indifferent between the two HCs. Therefore, we can summarize it in the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 3.  
When R1=R2, strategy x:{Gi=Ri} is Nash equilibrium. 
Proof: For homogenous HCs in equilibrium, both HCs use the same strategies 
{Gi=Ri} where all the HC’s benefits are transferred to the MNC. 
 Usually, an HC has budgetary constraints on the value of the grant. Note 
that imposing budgetary constraints on the grants is way for coordination between 
the HCs. Let assume that Yi is the maximum amount of the grant that can be offered 
by HCi. There are several possibilities: 
• 2211 RYandRY ≥≥ : In this case, the budgetary constraints are not effective, 
so there is no change in the equilibrium. 
• 2211 RYandRY <≥ : In this case, the equilibrium strategies are such that 
HC2 offers Y2 (lower than R2) and HC1 offers Y2+ and wins the MNC. In this 
case, the surplus of HC1 is R1-(Y2+) > 0. 
• 212211 YYandRYandRY ><< : In this case, the equilibrium strategies are 
such that HC2 offers Y2, and HC1 offers Y2+ and wins the MNC. In this case, 
HC1’s surplus is R1-(Y2+) > 0. 
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 The above model explains why some countries make their grant policy 
vague. Each HC determines its optimal grant by using information on the other HC’s 
constraint. Secrecy can induce the HC with the higher budget constraint to make 
errors and lose the MNC’s investment. 
4.2 Incentives Competition when Countries Differ 
Let us consider the case where the two HCs differ with respect to their FDI benefits. 
The difference may stem from different spillovers from the MNC to the HC, 
different unemployment rates, and so on. We investigate the impact of this 
difference on the characteristics of the equilibrium. 
 As in the previous sections, two HCs are competing for a subsidiary of one 
MNC, such that R1>R2. Each HC offers a grant (Gi), which can be chosen from a 
list of M possible levels such that: Gi1<Gi2....<GiM. We assume that if there are the 
same yearly after-tax cash flows ti·iin both countries, then the MNC would prefer 
the country that offers the higher grant. 
 The dominant strategy for each HCi can be considered according to the 
following propositions: 
Proposition 4. 
The highest grant that HCi offers is less then Ri. 
Proof: 
See Proposition 1’s proof. 
Proposition 5. 
If HC2 uses strategy y:{G2=R2} then HC1’s dominant strategy is x: {G1=R2+. 
Proof: 
For HC2 strategy y:{G2=R2}, The net benefit of country one depends on G1 as 
follows: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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 Note, that if HC1 offers G1=G2, it will win the MNC investment with 
probability of ½, and the expected added value is as described above. Since R1>R2, 
it is worth it for HC1 to offer a higher grant value (G1>G2) and to win the MNC 
investment. 
Proposition 6. 
The strategy of HC2 y:{G2=R2} and HC1 x:{G1=R2+ are equilibrium strategies. 
Proof: 
For HC1 strategy x:{G1=R2+,  the changes in HC2’s net benefit as a result of 
changing its strategy y:{G2=R2} are: 
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 When HC1 offers a grant such that G1= R2+, HC2 does not gain by 
offering the same grant (proposition 4), as the expected benefits of HC2 are negative. 
On the other hand, HC2 does not gain by offering a grant smaller than R2. Therefore, 
the equilibrium strategies are: y:{G2=R2} and x:{G1=R2+.  
 In this section, we have shown that, when there are two different HCs and 
one MNC, the HC with the higher benefit wins the MNC investment. This HC pays 
a grant amount that is equal to the benefits of the other country. Thus, part of the 
HC’s benefits remains in the HC. 
 Note, if budgetary constraints are relevant, then the HC with the higher 
constraint wins the MNC’s investment–not necessarily the HC with the higher 
benefits. Thus, we can conclude that budgetary constraints may cause inefficiency. 
4.3 Two Countries and Two MNCs 
Assume that there are two HCi’s (i=1,2) and two MNCs. If there is no MNC 
investing at HCi, the benefits of this HCi is zero (Ri0=0). If one MNC invests at HCi, 
the benefits are Ri1, and if both MNCs invest in HCi the total benefits are Ri2. We 
assume decreasing marginal benefits when the number of subsidiaries increases 
(
2
RR i2i1 > ), and, if the MNCs are similar, the offered grant by HCi is the same for 
both HCs. The net benefits of HCi are: iiji GjRNB ⋅−=  (where j=0,1,2 and count 
the number of MNCs that invest in HCi).  
 
Table 2. Net benefits matrix for two countries and two MNCs 
G2M ....... G22 G21  
MGR 222 2;0 ⋅−
 
....... 
2222 G2R;0 ⋅−  ( )
( )
0
4
1
2
1
2
4
1
11
12
⋅+
−+
⋅−
ii
ii
GR
GR
 
G11 
M222 G2R;0 ⋅−
 
....... 
( )
( )
0
4
1
GR
2
1
G2R
4
1
2i1i
2i2i
⋅+
−+
⋅−
 
0;G2R 1212 ⋅−  G12 
Optimal policy for FDI incentives: An auction theory approach 
 
69 
 
M  O  M  M  M  
( )
( )
0
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1
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2
1
G2R
4
1
iM1i
iM2i
⋅+
−+
⋅−
 
....... 0;2 112 MGR ⋅−  0;G2R M112 ⋅−  G1M 
 
 Table 2 presents the net benefits for each HC. Each HC can offer the MNCs 
a grant of Gim (m=1,2…M). The various types of grants are ordered by their size 
(Gi1<Gi2....<GiM) and G1m=G2m for each m . For example: if HC1 offers G14 and HC2 
offers G23, both MNCs will invest at HC1 and net benefits for HC1 
are 14121 2 GRNB ⋅−= . If HC1 offers G13 and HC2 offers G23, then the outcome is as 
follows: the probability that both MNCs invest at HC1 is ¼; the probability is ½ that 
one MNC invests in HC1 and ¼ that there is no investment at HC1. The expected net 
benefits for HC1 in this case are: 
 
( ) ( ) 0
4
1
2
12
4
1
13111312 ⋅+−+⋅− GRGR . 
 
 If HC1 offers G12 and HC2 offers G23, both MNCs will invest at HC2 and net 
benefits for HC1 is zero. 
 We will show that each HC gains by increasing its grant up to a specific 
limit GMax. 
Proposition 8. 
Equilibrium exists for every pair of grants (G1=G2) that satisfies: 
MaxiMin GGG ≤≤  where: 
 
0
4
1R
2
1R
4
3G 1i2iMin ⋅−⋅−⋅=  
 
and 
 
0
4
3R
2
1R
4
1G 1i2iMax ⋅−⋅+⋅= . 
Proof: 
The lower boundary: Let us assume that HC2 offers G2<GMin; HC1 can offer G1<G2. 
In this case, HC2 wins and both MNCs invest in HC2 and NB1 (HC1’s net benefit) 
equal to 0. 
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 If HC1 offers G1=G2, then, with probability ¼, both MNCs invest in HC1; 
with probability ½, one MNC invests in HC1; and with probability ¼ there is no 
investment in HC1. The expected net benefit for HC1, in this case is: 
 
( ) ( ) 0
4
1
2
1
4
10
4
1
2
12
4
1)( 21112211212211 ⋅+−+=⋅+−+−== GRRGRGRGGNB . 
 
 However, HC1 can offer G1=G2+<GMin. In this case, both MNCs invest in 
HC1, and ( )εε +−=+= 212211 2)( GRGGNB . 
 It turns out that: 
 
0)( 211 >= GGNB  
 
and that 
 
)( 121 ε+= GGNB > 0)( 121 >= GGNB . 
 
If HC2 offers G2<GMin then HC1 gains by setting G1=G2+<GMin. Therefore, any 
grants below GMin are not in equilibrium. 
 
The middle range: Let us assume that HC2 offers a grant such that GMax>G2>GMin. 
Now there are three possibilities for HC1: 
1. HC1 can offer G1<G2. In this case HC2 wins both subsidiaries and NB1 
(HC1’s net benefit) is equal to 0. 
2. HC1 can offer G1=G2. In this case, there is a lottery (with a probability of ¼ 
that both MNCs invest in HC1; a probability of ½ that one MNC invests in 
HC1 and ¼ that there is no investment in HC1). The expected net benefit for 
HC1 is: 
 
( ) ( ) 0
4
1
2
1
4
10
4
1
2
12
4
1
211122112121 ⋅+−+=⋅+−+−= GRRGRGRNB . 
 
3. HC1 can offer G1=G2+>G2. In this case, both MNCs invest in HC1 and the 
net benefit is: ( )ε+−= 2121 2 GRNB . 
Simple calculations reveal that: 
•  If G2<GMax, then offering G1=G2 provides HC1 with a higher NB than it can get 
by choosing G1<G2. 
• If G2<GMax, then offering G1=G2 provides HC1 with a higher NB than it can get 
by choosing G1= ( )ε+2G . 
 Therefore, equilibrium exists for any pair of grants (G1=G2) that 
satisfies: MaxiMin GGG ≤≤ . 
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The upper boundary: HC will not offer G>GMax. 
 
Explanation: If HC2 offers G2 that is greater than GMax and if G1>G2, then both 
MNCs invest in HC1, and its expected net benefit is: 
 
( ) 02
2
10
4
3
2
1
4
122 1112111212121 <−−=




 +⋅−+⋅−=+−= εεε RRRRRGRNB Max
 
If G1=G2 then a lottery occurs and: 
 
( ) 0
2
1
4
1
2
1
4
1
2
1
4
1
1112111211121 <




 +⋅+⋅−+=+−+= εε RRRRGRRNB Max  
 
Since, in both cases, NBi is negative, HC never offers a G which is above GMax. 
 To summarize, we showed that: 
• When an HC offers G<GMin the other HC gains by increasing its grant.  
• HC will never offer G>GMax. 
• Any G such that GMax>G>GMin is an equilibrium if both HCs offer this grant. 
• The lower boundary and the upper boundary of the equilibrium strategies can be 
derived from the following argument: Each HC may give up an MNC 
investment and then its NB is 0. On the other hand, a country may increase its 
grant offer and can attract the investment of both MNCs. In this case the NB 
equals Ri2-2·Gi. Then G1=G2 is an equilibrium if: 
 
( ) ( ) { }i2ii1ii2i G2R,0max04
1GR
2
1G2R
4
1
−≥⋅+−+⋅− . 
 
• This inequality provides us with the two boundaries. The lower boundary is: 
 
0
4
1R
2
1R
4
3G 1i2iMin ⋅−⋅−⋅= , 
 
• and the upper boundary is:  
 
0
4
3R
2
1R
4
1G 1i2iMax ⋅−⋅+⋅= . 
 
• Note that G1=G2, such that GMax>Gi>GMin, is an equilibrium, but each HC may 
suffer ex-post loss. The equilibrium strategies ensure that the expected net 
benefit is positive. But, if an HC paid a high grant and won both MNCs, then the 
total amount of the grants may be higher than the total net benefits of the HC, 
which are derived from the entrance of the two MNCs. This outcome may 
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explain why in most countries there is no automatic system of offering grants for 
all possible MNC projects. 
4.4 The Number of MNCs Is Large 
We have shown in the previous sections that the power of the HCs increases as the 
number of MNCs rises. When the number of HCs is high and there are only a few 
MNCs, the HCs compete for the FDI in order to gain its benefits. Each HC is willing 
to offer the MNC a large share of the benefits rather than remain with no FDI. On 
the other hand, when the number of MNCs is large, each HC knows that one of these 
MNCs will eventually invest there even if the incentive is low or there are no 
incentives at all. Furthermore, an HC may set constraints on FDI, such as licensing. 
An MNC may prefer to pay the HC the license rather than cancel its investment plan 
and lose any potential profits. Such an HC gains all the benefits of the FDI as well as 
part of the MNC’s profits. 
 
5. Incomplete Information of Benefits 
 
In the previous sections, under the assumption of complete information, all 
the participants in the incentives competition know the value of all the variables. In 
this section, we introduce a model with incomplete information. Specifically, each 
country knows its own benefit, R, but has no precise information on the competitor’s 
R. Similarly, the MNC knows its own expected profits, but does not know each 
country’s iR . 
 For simplicity’s sake, we assume that each iR is uniformly distributed on 
the [0,1] range, and this information is available to all the participants. 
5.1 The Case of Two HCs and One MNC 
We assume that Ri denotes the net benefit for HCi (i=1,2), and that it is uniformly 
distributed (Ri~U[0,1]). Each HCi offers a grant that depends on its own iR : 
)( ii RfG = . We also assume symmetric grant function such that if ji RR =  then 
ji GG = . 
HCi consideration 
 
HCi’s net benefit is: 
 












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=−
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=
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0
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Note that we actually ignore the case where 21 GG = , as a continuous density 
function is assumed. 
 The two HCs use the same grant function, f1(R) =f2(R) due to the symmetry 
between HC1 and HC2. The optimal grant policy of HC1 is the one that maximizes its 
expected net benefit: 
 
( ) ( )( )21 Pr RfGGRMAXG >⋅− , 
 
and due to the uniform distribution the abject function can be written as: 
 
( ) )( 1111 GfGRMAXf
−⋅−  
 
f-1 is defined as the inverse of )( ii RfG = . 
 Equilibrium exists when f satisfies (see Krishna, 2002): 
 
11 2
1 RG ⋅= . 
 
 Let us show that the strategy: “each HC suggests a grant that is equal to half 
of the MNC net benefit” is equilibrium. Assume that 22 R2
1G ⋅= . In this case, HC1 
acts as follows: 
 
( ) 




 ⋅>⋅− 2111G
R
2
1GPrGRMAX
1
= ( ) ( )2111 2Pr
1
RGGRMAX
G
>⋅⋅− =
( ) 111 2
1
GGRMAX
G
⋅⋅−  
 
First-order condition for maximum is: 
 
042 11 =⋅−⋅ GR , 
 
and therefore, 
 
11 2
1 RG ⋅=  . 
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 When HC2 uses f2=½, then HC1 uses f1=½ as well. Because of symmetry, if 
HC1 uses f1=½, then HC2 uses f2=½ as well. Therefore, equilibrium exists when each 
HC offers a grant that is half of its net benefit. 
5.2 The Case of Several HCs and One MNC Under Incomplete Information 
There are several symmetric HCi (i=1,2…N) and one MNC, assuming incomplete 
information such that each HC knows its own net benefit (Ri) but the other Rs are 
unknown except their distribution function. An HC’s considerations are: 
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Thus, the object function is: 
 
( ) ( )( )jjjiiiiG RfGGRMAX ≠>⋅− maxPr   
 
and the equilibrium strategies are (see Krishna, 2002): 
 
( ) iii RN
NRf ⋅−= 1  for each HCi. 
 
 We can see that as the number of HCs increases, the offered grant increases 
as well. The reason for this is that the probability of winning the MNC’s investment 
decreases as the number of HCs increases, and each HC compensates by raising its 
grant. Therefore, when the number of HCs is large, the G approaches R, and the 
HC’s net benefit decreases. 
 In summary, this section investigates cases of incentives competition under 
incomplete information. When one MNC faces two HCs, equilibrium exists when 
each HC offers a grant that is equal to half its benefits. In equilibrium, the subsidiary 
will be established in the HC where its contribution to the economy is higher. The 
HC enjoys half of the benefits of the FDI. 
 An increase in the number of potential HCs increases the grant 
offered by each HC as well. Therefore, more intense incentives competition 
increases the share of the HC’s benefits.  
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper investigated incentives competition in cases where there is 
complete information on the HC’s benefits as well as the MNC’s profits. Each 
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country tries to attract FDI by offering the MNC an incentive. We applied models of 
auction theory to this problem, presented the optimal strategies for each HC, and 
characterized the Nash equilibrium strategies. 
 There are two main questions regarding the equilibrium of the incentives 
competition: 
1. What is the portion of an HC’s benefits that is spent on FDI incentives? 
2. Is the global allocation of investment optimal? That is, should FDI go first to 
HCs with higher productivity, and only when the size of the FDI is large should 
the low productivity HCs get their share of the investment?  
 The main results are as follows. When there is one MNC and two (identical) 
HCs competing for an investment, at equilibrium, each HC offers an incentive that is 
equal to its total benefit derived from the FDI. This is the only case where our 
results coincided with those of Blomstrom and Kokko (2003), who argued that a set 
of rules is required to limit the level of incentives and to let each MNC gain a major 
part of the FDI benefits. 
 If there is a constraint on the amount of the incentives (due to a budget 
shortage or global regulation), the incentives competition leads to an equilibrium 
where a larger share of the benefits remains in the HC, but it can also lead to 
inefficiency where the new subsidiary is located in the less productive HC. This 
finding supports Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006), who argued that competition between 
HCs improves the efficiency in the allocation of FDI in HCs.  
 When the two HCs differ with respect to their benefits, the HC with the 
higher benefit wins the race and can offer incentives that are equal to the other HC’s 
lower benefit. 
 When the HCs face several MNCs, and under the assumption of diminishing 
benefits, the equilibrium of the incentives competition consists of a range of possible 
incentives. In this case, it is possible that the actual value of the incentives is greater 
than the total benefits of the HC. 
 Thus, we have shown that under complete information the characteristics of 
the incentives competition equilibrium depend on the number of participants in the 
game, which is the number of HCs that compete for FDI as well as the number of 
MNCs who are looking for investment location.  
 Couples of models are analyzed under the assumption of incomplete 
information. When one MNC faces two HCs, equilibrium exists when each HC 
offers a grant that is equal to half the benefits, and the subsidiary will be established 
in the HC where its contribution to the economy is higher. An increase in the 
number of potential HCs increases the grant offered by each HC as well. Therefore, 
more intense incentives competition increases the share of the MNC’s benefits. 
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